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McCulloch at 200 
David S. Schwartz 
March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme 
Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,1 
upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United 
States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. 
McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by 
the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the 
banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was 
probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing 
loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own 
state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the 
Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers 
are limited to those legislative means that  are indispensably 
necessary to the viability of the enumerated power. Instead, 
Marshall concluded, Congress must have discretion to choose 
among any means convenient or well-adapted to implementing 
the government’s granted powers. After concluding that Congress 
had the power to create the Second Bank, the McCulloch opinion 
turned to the question of whether Maryland could tax it. 
Reasoning that the essence of federal supremacy is to remove all 
obstacles to federal government action within its sphere, Marshall 
concluded that states cannot tax operations of the federal 
government. 
For more than a century, constitutional scholars have agreed 
with James Bradley Thayer’s 1901 appraisal of McCulloch as 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s “greatest opinion” and “the chief 
illustration” of Marshall’s “giving free scope to the power of the 
national government.”2 But the case has meant many things to 
 Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. 
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. James Bradley Thayer, John Marshall (1901), reprinted in and quoted from JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN 
MARSHALL 66 (1967). See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219 (1955)(“the conception of the nation which Marshall derived 
from the Constitution and set forth in M’Culloch v. Maryland is his greatest single judicial 
performance.”); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 42 (1960)( 
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many courts and commentators over the years. For example, in 
2012, in National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”) 
v. Sebelius,3 the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care
Act, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments debated the meaning
of McCulloch and the justices divided over whether Marshall’s
decision meant the law was constitutional or not. As Michael
Klarman has summed up, “Twentieth-century advocates of
expansive national power have insisted that Marshall’s capacious
understandings of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Commerce Clause were sufficient to accommodate the modern
regulatory state.”4 In contrast, G. Edward White concludes that
Marshall’s nationalism in a case like McCulloch was “not
nationalism in the modern sense of support for affirmative
plenary federal regulatory power” but “can more accurately be
described as a critique of reserved state sovereignty.”5  Perhaps
because of this variation in understandings led Sanford Levinson
to observe in 2014 that McCulloch is “the richest and most
important single opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
our entire history.”6
Despite such room for divergent interpretation, Gerard 
Magliocca was undoubtedly right when he observed in 2006 that 
“the opinion’s fame has not generated a commensurate level of 
academic commentary on the decision that the Court actually 
reached.”7 Twelve years later, that commensurate level of 
academic commentary is well underway. Mark Killenbeck’s 2006 
book, M’Culloch v. Maryland: Securing A Nation – the first 
McCulloch is, “by almost any reckoning, the greatest decision John Marshall ever handed 
down.”); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Southern Constitutional Tradition, in 
AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 105, 
108 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989) (rating McCulloch as “possibly the most 
far-reaching decision ever handed down by the Supreme Court”). 
3. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
4. Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshal Court Decisions?, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1128, n. 82 (2001) (citing sources). 
5.  G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835,
vols 3-4 of THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 486 
(1988). 
6. Sanford Levinson, Course Description: A Close Reading of McCulloch v.
Maryland, HARV. L. SCH. ONLINE CATALOGUE (Fall 2014), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=67026 
[https://perma.cc/YAJ3-YYLA].   
7. Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 125 (2006). 
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monograph-length study of McCulloch8—  and Sanford 
Levinson’s close-reading classes at Harvard and University of 
Texas Law Schools (which involved reading the entire 
McCulloch opinion aloud with frequent stops for discussion), 
have powerfully demonstrated that the case is worth careful study 
and attention rather than the talismanic treatment it has long been 
given. Legal scholars should not lightly assume that the shorthand 
conventional story tells us all we need to know about the case. 
Exciting new work is starting to come out, exploring the 
ambiguities of McCulloch, its historical context and trajectory, 
and its present-day meaning for constitutional law. To help move 
this scholarly enterprise forward, the annual Wisconsin 
Discussion Group on Constitutionalism hosted by the University 
of Wisconsin Law School made its fall 2018 topic “McCulloch v. 
Maryland at 200: the Past and Future of American Constitutional 
Law.” Thirteen constitutional law and legal history scholars 
gathered for an intensive discussion and presented papers on 
numerous facets and interpretations of Marshall’s great opinion.9  
8. MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION  (2006);
see also RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM: MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND AND 
THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (2007). 
9. In addition to the papers published in this symposium, the workshop papers
included: Sam Erman, University of Southern California Law Center, A Constitution of 
Empire without McCulloch v. Maryland; Neil Komesar, University of Wisconsin Law 
School,  False Flags and Fragments– The Questionable Past and Uncertain Future of the 
Analysis of Judicial Review; Alison LaCroix, University of Chicago Law School, The Brig, 
the Steamboat, and the Immense Mass of State Laws; Martin Lederman, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Letter or Spirit? What Does it Mean to “Never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding”?; Sophia Lee, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Our 
Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the 
Present; Eric Lomazoff, Villanova University, Dept. of Political Science, Did John Marshall 
Have a Death Wish for his McCulloch Opinion? The Dangerous Invitation in “A Friend to 
the Union” No. 2; John Mikhail, Georgetown University Law Center, McCulloch’s Strategic 
Ambiguity; Brad Snyder, Georgetown University Law Center, McCulloch, Brown, and 
Section 5; Matthew Steilen, University of Buffalo School of Law, A Virginia Perspective on 
McCulloch.  
For other new work on McCulloch, see ERIC LOMAZOFF, RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL 
BANK CONTROVERSY: POLITICS AND LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2018); 
DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200-
YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (forthcoming 2019); Mark R. Killenbeck, 
“All Banks in Like Manner Taxed?” Maryland and the Second Bank of the United States, 44 
Journal of Supreme Court History (forthcoming 2019). See also 2019 Salmon P. Chase 
Distinguished Lecture and Faculty Colloquium on “McCulloch at 200” 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/constitution-center/chase-lecture-and-colloquium/chase-
lecture-colloquium/ [https://perma.cc/BLW8-G8ST] 
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The University of Arkansas Law Review generously offered 
publication to a selection of the papers presented at the workshop. 
These papers follow. 
Sanford Levinson leads off with The Confusing Language of 
McCulloch v. Maryland:  Did Marshall Really Know What He 
Was Doing (or Meant)? Levinson confronts a key idea that has 
seemed innocuous to generations of readers of the opinion, but 
that turns out to be quite momentous. In calling Maryland “a 
sovereign state” at the start of the opinion, Marshall was using a 
term freighted with historical and contested meaning. Levinson 
demonstrates that constitutional platitudes about divided 
sovereignty in our federal system beg crucial theoretical 
questions. Mark Killenbeck’s contribution, M’Culloch in 
Context, argues that a better understanding of the opinion can be 
gained by reading it in conjunction with  the other two great cases 
of the 1819 term, Dartmouth College v. Woodward10 and Sturges 
v. Crowninshield.11 The three cases together, Killenbeck argues,
demonstrate a nationalist project that was betrayed by the Taney
Court and its successors until the mid-twentieth century.
The next two pieces, Mark Graber’s Overruling 
McCulloch?, and my own Defying McCulloch? Jackson’s Bank 
Veto Reconsidered, are something of a matched pair examining 
the fate of McCulloch in the Jacksonian era. Graber offers 
fascinating portraits of the sixteen men who served on the Taney 
Court (1836-1864), demonstrating the dominance of their 
political commitments to Jacksonian ideas. Against this 
backdrop, he argues that it was unnecessary for the Court to 
formally overrule McCulloch to implement the Jacksonian pro-
slavery, states’-rights constitutional vision because that was being 
done by Jacksonian presidents and congressional majorities. 
Graber introduces the idea of “partisan supremacy,” in which the 
Court defers to the political branches in matters of constitutional 
interpretation when doing so is consistent with the justices’ 
partisan commitments. In Defying McCulloch?, I argue that 
Jackson’s famous veto of the recharter of the Second Bank 
contains important cross-currents at odds with the conventional 
picture of the veto as a landmark of presidential defiance of the 
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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Supreme Court. When read closely as a legal text, the Bank Veto 
Message lays out a doctrinal roadmap for undermining 
McCulloch without overruling it—a roadmap assiduously 
followed by the Taney Court. 
The symposium concludes with the contribution by Yxta 
Murray, entitled What FEMA Should Do After Puerto Rico: 
Toward Critical Administrative Constitutionalism. Murray brings 
McCulloch into the 21st century by applying it to constitutional 
issues raised by the federal government’s inadequate response to 
the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. 
Murray points to McCulloch’s requirement that “necessary and 
proper” laws must conform to “the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution.” Rather than construing that qualification as a 
limitation authorizing courts to strike down acts of Congress, 
Murray argues that it should be understood as imposing an 
obligation on Congress to affirmatively promote constitutional 
norms, such as the guarantee of equal protection. 
A word of thanks is due to Professor Mark Killenbeck, the 
Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor of Law at the University 
of Arkansas School of Law. Professor Killenbeck was well 
established as a leading scholar in Constitutional Law and 
American Legal History when he published the first book-length 
study of McCulloch in 2006. This outstanding work, which is an 
essential starting point for research into the case, has inspired 
much of the significant interest in McCulloch that has emerged in 
the last decade. Professor Killenbeck, far from claiming 
McCulloch as his own scholarly “turf,” has been extremely 
supportive of other scholars attempting to contribute to this 
subject. In the highest traditions of collegiality, he has generously 
devoted time to reading drafts and offering insightful comments, 
sharing his comprehensive knowledge of U.S. constitutional 
history. The participation of the Arkansas Law Review in 
publishing this symposium is the direct result of Professor 
Killenbeck’s good offices. 
We welcome you the reader to join this scholarly birthday 
party for McCulloch at 200. What better way to celebrate the great 
case than to give it a close and new look. 
